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DICTIONARIES FAIL: THE VOLCKER RULE’S RELIANCE ON
DEFINITIONS RENDERS IT INEFFECTIVE AND A NEW
SOLUTION IS NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY REGULATE
PROPRIETARY TRADING.
R. Rex Chatterjee
Abstract
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, Congress enacted
legislation to regulate the proprietary trading activities of Wall Street
banks. The Volcker Rule, passed into law as section 619 of the DoddFrank Act, bans proprietary trading for deposit-taking banks and bankholding companies with deposit-taking subsidiaries or affiliates. It
nevertheless allows these institutions to continue to trade on behalf of
customers, a category of transactions necessary for the healthy
functioning of both the U.S. and global financial systems. The Rule
proposes that regulators devise rules to distinguish between permissible,
often client-facing trades, and impermissible proprietary trades. The rules
rely on definitions and metrics to form bright-line distinctions. The thesis
of this article is that such a system is doomed to fail because of inherent
methodological flaws.
This article analyzes the regulation of banking entities under the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 in order to demonstrate the successful
implementation of a structure-based regulatory regime that separated
investment banks from commercial banks. As a result, proprietary
trading activities were structurally insulated from institutional access to
the Federal Reserve Bank’s Discount Window. This article
acknowledges the argument that a return to a Glass-Steagall-style
regulatory regime is infeasible following the passage of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act of 1999, which gave rise to modern financial
institutions. This explains why the Volcker Rule focuses on transactions
instead of structure.
This article concludes by proposing an alternative regulatory plan
that would sidestep the problem-laden task of attempting to distinguish
proprietary from non-proprietary trading on a bright-line basis; instead,
the proposed regime would focus on regulating all sales and trading
activities together on a structural level. The plan would cleave trading
operations from the banking entities’ structures by separating them into
subsidiary entities with independent capitalization and ownership. This
plan is engineered to isolate traders from the moral hazards created by
institutional access to the Federal Reserve Discount Window.
Furthermore, it would shackle the continuance of their client-serving
operations to the risks taken in their proprietary books.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This article analyzes issues arising from the proposed
implementation of Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, also known as the
Volcker Rule. First proposed by Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Bank, the Rule tightly restricts the ability of banking
entities to engage in certain financial activities, namely, proprietary
trading, investing in hedge funds,and investing in private equity funds.
Congress targeted these activities because of their high potential for
creating substantial financial risk, on both a firm and system-wide level.
The Rule specifically targets banking entities with access to the Federal
Reserve Bank’s Discount Window1 because the availability of “cheap”
federal funds can yield a greater tolerance for risk at the expense of the
U.S. taxpayer. Ultimately, this creates a moral hazard problem. This
article focuses on the inefficiency of the Volcker Rule in regulating
banking activity, specifically in terms of prohibiting proprietary trading.
Part II of this article provides a concise discourse on the ways in
which financial reform legislation after the crash of 1929 focused on the
securities dealing and investment banking activities of commercial
banks. It analyzes the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which banned
commercial banks from engaging in securities dealing, and the effect of
its eventual repeal through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. The
legislation process for the Dodd-Frank Act originated as a reaction to a
major financial crisis in the United States. In this way, it is similar to the
process which yielded the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Glass-Steagall
isolated the business of commercial banking from that of investment
banking on an institutional level. The recombination of these business
lines within modern financial institutions, as permitted by GrammLeach-Bliley, gave rise to certain perverse incentives which the Volcker
Rule has been designed to address. Part II then proceeds to explain why a
return to Glass-Steagall-style regulation of the financial industry would
be impractical in the present situation because of developments in the
structures of financial institutions since 1999. The section concludes with
the notion that the Volcker Rule effectuates the same principles of
financial regulation as Glass-Steagall without its burdensome restrictions
on the structure of financial institutions.
Part III begins with an exploration of exactly what proprietary
trading is. The Glass-Steagall Act prohibited US depository institutions
from engaging in proprietary trading. Proprietary trading is regarded as
1
The Discount Window, as it is referred to here, is a credit facility operated by the US Federal
Reserve Bank to allow financial institutions to borrow money from the Federal Reserve in order to
cover a liquidity shortage. The loans are generally made on a secured basis and are made at the
“discount rate.” For the purposes of this article, it is important to understand simply that financial
institutions with access to the Discount Window have access to federal government money at a very
low interest rate. For further reading, see generally Discount Window,WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discount_window (last modified Sept. 14, 2011, 10:11 AM). See also,
Discount Window, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/discountwindow.asp (last
visited Oct. 25, 2011).
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one of the many causes of financial instability which gave rise to the
system-wide crash and subsequent recession. The section then proceeds
to highlight certain instances where proprietary trading caused significant
instability within major US financial institutions. It concludes with a
discussion of public sentiment in reaction to proprietary trading.
Part IV of this article focuses on the interconnections between
proprietary trading and so-called “permitted banking activities.” Despite
the harm that proprietary trading caused during the crisis of 2008-2009, it
would cripple financial markets worldwide if all proprietary trading were
made illegal in one fell swoop of the legislative pen. The Volcker Rule
includes a carve-out provision to maintain the legality of certain
proprietary trading activities. These activities are necessary to maintain
adequate liquidity in financial markets, support access to capital markets
through underwriting, and to pursue other legitimate business purposes.
However, at the margins, it becomes difficult to distinguish proprietary
trading from many of the permitted banking activities. Significant issues
arise in attempting to distinguish one set from the other. Proprietary
trading is defined in Part III. Part IV discusses the set of permitted
activities, and then proceeds to discuss how banking entities may seek to
disguise proprietary trading activities as permitted activities in order to
evade the Volcker Rule.
Part V of this article discusses different potential definitions of a set
of key terms which set the boundary between proprietary trading and
permissible banking activities. It will be necessary for a regulatory
system to precisely and predictably distinguish the two. Overly broad
definitions will negatively impact capital market liquidity as well as
myriad types of financial transactions worldwide. Overly narrow
definitions will render the statute meaningless and will do little to
prevent a future crisis. Imprecise definitions will lead to a cat-and-mouse
game between banking entities and regulators. The statute, as written,
leaves much discretion to US financial regulatory agencies.
Part VI concludes that the Volcker Rule will be ineffective in its
mission of prohibiting harmful proprietary trading. Furthermore, the
section hypothesizes that regulatory regime that will be created to
enforce the rule will be overwhelmed by largely unnecessary tasks and
that agencies will be beset by litigation over the definition of the key
terms highlighted above.
Part VII, an epilogue to this article’s analysis of the Volcker Rule,
suggests an alternative regime for the regulation of proprietary trading.
The alternative regime utilizes bankruptcy-remoteness and the
partnership model as two techniques to align managerial incentives with
an amount of risk-aversion necessary for the ongoing health of the global
financial system. The section provides a skeleton-level outline of the
regime and notes where future study will be necessary to develop it. It
analyzes potential ramifications of the proposed regime and discusses
barriers to its implementation.
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II. GLASS-STEAGALL, GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY, AND THE ROAD TO THE
2008 CRISIS
A. The Role of Proprietary Trading in Shaping the Glass-Steagall Act of
1933
The stock market crash of 1929 triggered upwards of 11,000
commercial bank failures between the years 1930 and 1933.2 In response
to the catastrophic event, Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act, also
known as the Banking Act of 19333 The congressional hearings on the
bill examined the causes of the crash and identified specific banking
practices that led to instability within the financial system.4 Many of the
identified practices were proprietary in nature, particularly banks’
practice of underwriting transactions and investments in securities.5
Members of Congress viewed these activities with skepticism because
the activities subjected commercial bankers—entrusted to give
depositors sound and impartial investment advice—to the pecuniary
financial incentives of investment bankers and securities dealers, who
generate profits by underwriting, sales, trading, and distribution of
securities.6 Congressmen were of the opinion that as the securities
businesses of banks grew larger, the pecuniary incentives became more
powerful and increasingly destabilized the US financial system, partially
causing the 1929 crash.7
In 1932, Congress formed the Pecora Commission to investigate
banking practices in the years leading up to 1929 crash.8 The
Commission published its findings in 1934 and largely confirmed
Congress’s proposed ‘factors’ that gave rise to the 1929 crash, including
proprietary trading.9 For example, the Commission found that investment
banks’ incentives conflicted with the fiduciary duties owed to
2
Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., § 96.02 Separation of Investment and Commercial Bank
Services, in BANKING LAW 1 (2010).
3
Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994).
4
See generally Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A
History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483 (1971).
5
S. REP. NO. 73-77 (1933).
6
See, e.g., 75 CONG. REC. 9875, 9912 (1932) (remarks of Senator Bulkley) (The banker ought
to be regarded as the financial confidant and mentor of his depositors. . . .Obviously, the banker who
has nothing to sell to his depositors is much better qualified to advise disinterestedly and to regard
diligently the safety of depositors than the banker who uses the list of depositors in his savings
department to distribute circulars concerning the advantages of this, that, or the other investment on
which the bank is to receive an originating profit or an underwriting profit or a distribution profit or
a trading profit or any combination of such profits.).
7
See, e.g., 75 CONG. REC. 9904 (1932) (statement of Senator Walcott) (“Most of the banks had
been engaged in underwriting, and still are. The security business became such an important part of
the operations of some of the banks, particularly of two or three of our larger banks, that some fear
was occasioned that they would get away from the strictly commercial business for which they were
organized and put out securities of doubtful value. At any rate, there was a conflict of opinion; there
was a conflict between the business of marketing securities and the business of protecting
depositors’ money.”).
8
See generally GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT
BANKING: THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED (1990).
9
See generally S. REP. NO. 73-1455 (1934).
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commercial bank depositors.10 The report stated that if a bank can act as
both a dealer and as a customer agent on the same transaction, then it has
an inherent conflict of interest.11 These findings further substantiated
Congress’s opinion that as banks increased their involvement in
securities trading, their pecuniary incentives became more powerful,
resulting in behavior that destabilized the U.S. financial system and
partially caused the 1929 crash.12
B. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the Effect of its Repeal Through
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
The securities activities of commercial banks led to the enactment of
the Glass-Steagall Act. Glass-Steagall cleaved investment banking from
commercial banking, thus curbing the ability of commercial banks to
engage in securities dealing (i.e., trading securities for their own
accounts).13 Glass-Steagall also prohibited securities underwriters from
taking deposits14 and it likewise prevented member banks from affiliating
with companies that primarily engaged in underwriting or securities
dealing.15 Commercial banks had to cease their securities dealing
activities. Many banks chose to spin off their investment banking and
securities businesses into separate firms. For example, J.P. Morgan &
Co. split into two entities: a commercial bank keeping the name J.P.
Morgan & Co. and an investment bank called Morgan
Stanley.16Although commercial banks eventually expanded their ability
to underwrite securities even under the Glass-Steagall Act’s
regulations,17 it strictly prohibited banks from engaging in proprietary
trading.

10

Id. at 87.
Id. at 20 (“The New York Stock Exchange has adopted a rule prohibiting a member, when
acting as a broker, from buying or selling for his own account or that of a partner or for any account
in which he or a partner is interested, securities, the order for the sale or purchase of which has been
accepted by him or his firm or a partner for execution, except under the conditions specified in the
rule. However assiduous the exchange authorities may be in protecting the rights of the customer,
the conflict between the broker’s self-interest and his duty to his customer is present, and the
customer’s welfare is thereby endangered.”).
12
See, e.g., 75 CONG. REC. 9904 (1932) (statement of Senator Walcott) (“Most of the banks
had been engaged in underwriting, and still are. The security business became such an important part
of the operations of some of the banks, particularly of two or three of our larger banks, that some
fear was occasioned that they would get away from the strictly commercial business for which they
were organized and put out securities of doubtful value. At any rate, there was a conflict of opinion;
there was a conflict between the business of marketing securities and the business of protecting
depositors’ money.”).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE
OF MODERN FINANCE (2001).
17
Id. (“In the 1980s, commercial banks began trying to push back on Glass-Steagall’s
prohibition on securities underwriting. They started with commercial paper, but quickly moved on to
corporate debt securities. In 1989, the Fed permitted J.P. Morgan to underwrite a bond offering by
the Xerox Corporation. This was the first time since the institution of Glass-Steagall that a
commercial bank was allowed to underwrite corporate debt.”).
11
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The 1999 passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, also known as
the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, effectively reversed
the changes made by the Glass-Steagall Act.18 It repealed GlassSteagall’s prohibition of commercial banks from affiliating with
securities firms or investment banks and engaging in proprietary
securities dealing. It also amended the Bank Holding Company Act 19 to
make mergers between banks, insurers, and securities firms legal under a
holding company structure.20
Nine years after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall restrictions by
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the United States underwent a financial crisis
similar in magnitude to the 1929 crash. Nobel laureate economist Paul
Krugman has stated that the repeal of the Glass-Steagall reforms was one
of the causes of the financial crisis of 2008.21 Others have joined in
blaming Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s removal of Glass-Steagall’s restrictions
on the trading activities of banks for the economic calamity.22 Without
those restrictions, large banking entities could allow their investment
arms to take on increased risk in their trading activities while relying on
their commercial bank’s access to the Federal Reserve Bank’s Discount
Window as a financial backstop.23 This reintroduced what economists
call a “moral hazard” for banks24—a perverse incentive, the prevention
of which is a main purpose of lawmaking itself.

18
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106–02, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999); see also S. 900, 106th
Cong. (1999).
19
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–50 (amended 1999).
20
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
21
Paul Krugman, Bankers Without a Clue, NEW YORK TIMES ONLINE (Jan. 14, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/opinion/15krugman.html. (“But the truth is that the United
States managed to avoid major financial crises for half a century after the Pecora hearings were held
and Congress enacted major banking reforms. It was only after we forgot those lessons, and
dismantled effective regulation, that our financial system went back to being dangerously
unstable.”).
22
Damian Paletta & Kara Scannell, Ten Questions for Those Fixing the Financial Mess,THE
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
ONLINE
(Mar.
10,
2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123665023774979341.html. (“President Barack Obama argued on
the campaign trail that one bill – the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 – led to deregulation that
helped cause the crisis. Among other things, that law allowed for the creation of giant financial
supermarkets that could own investment banks, commercial banks and insurance firms, something
banned since the Great Depression. Its passage, critics say, cleared the way for companies that were
too big and intertwined to fail.”).
23
THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 18 (Richard Scott Carnell, Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller eds., Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2009).
24
Robert B. Ekelund & Mark Thornton, More Awful Truths About Republicans,LUDWIG VON
MISES INST. (Sep. 4, 2008), http://mises.org/daily/3098. (“The Financial Services Modernization Act
of 1999 would make perfect sense in a world regulated by a gold standard, 100% reserve banking,
and no FDIC deposit insurance; but in the world as it is, this ‘deregulation’ amounts to corporate
welfare for financial institutions and a moral hazard that will make taxpayers pay dearly. Such
government privileges are nothing new to Republicans—consider the effective subsidies to the
pharmaceutical, sugar, and steel industries—but this particular gift to financial institutions is what
allowed the credit bubble to expand to such absurd proportions, because it allowed banks of all types
to engage in increasingly risky transactions and to greatly expand the leverage of their balance
sheets.”).
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C. The Impracticalities of a Return to Glass-Steagall-style Regulation in
2011
Krugman argued that as Congress forgot the lessons it learned from
the Pecora Commission, it set itself up for a replay of the 1929 crash.25
He identified the need for new legislation that would prevent a future
crash of a similar nature from occurring.26 If figures such as Krugman
thought that the repeal of Glass-Steagall contributed significantly to the
2008 crash, it follows logically that they argued for a return to GlassSteagall-type regulation.27 In December 2009, Senators John McCain and
Maria Cantwell jointly proposed to reenact the Glass-Steagall Act,28 but
the bill did not pass.29
A return to Glass-Steagall’s restrictions on financial
conglomerates—e.g. combinations of commercial banking, investment
banking, and insurance underwriting—would be problematic because it
would force major U.S. financial institutions to dissect themselves and
reduce their global competitiveness in order to comply.
For example, Citicorp’s (a commercial bank) merger with Travelers
Group (an insurer) and its subsequent acquisition of SmithBarney (a
brokerage) was legalized by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999.30 It
would have to be unwound if the United States were to return to a strict
Glass-Steagall regulatory regime. In another example, Bank of America
acquired Merrill Lynch on September 14, 2008, after the latter’s losses
from trading in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) threatened to
collapse the firm.31 The acquisition illustrates how structural
combinations between commercial banks and securities firms are too
intertwined and vital in today’s financial markets to be undone. The
acquisition gave Bank of America, a leader in the U.S. financial sector, a
stronger competitive position worldwide.32
It is important to note that the financial industry, like everything else,
is becoming increasingly globalized as the new millennium progresses.
Among the many consequences of globalization is increased
international competition for business. The ability of businesses to
25

Id.
Id. ("Sooner or later, this runaway system was bound to crash. And if we don’t make
fundamental changes, it will happen all over again.").
27
Paul Krugman, Glass-Steagal, Part Deux, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/glass-steagal-part-deux.
28
Press
Release
of
Senator
Cantwell
(Dec.
16,
2009),
http://cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=320823.
29
Banking Integrity Act, S. 2886, 111th Cong. (2009) (referred to S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, Dec. 16, 2009, no further action taken.); see also Glass-Steagall
Restoration Act, H.R. 4375, 111th Cong. (2009) (referred to H. Comm. on Financial Services, Dec.
16, 2009, no further action taken).
30
See generallyLissa Lamkin Broome & Jerry W. Markham, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act:
An Overview (2001), available at http://www.symtrex.com/pdfdocs/glb_paper.pdf.
31
Matthew Karnitsching, Carrick Mollenkamp, & Dan Fitzpatrick, Bank of America to Buy
Merrill,WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2008), at A1.
32
Id. (“Merrill could give Bank of America strength around the world, including emerging
markets such as India. And Merrill is also strong in underwriting, an area Bank of America identified
last week at an investors’ conference where it would like to be more aggressive.”).
26
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relocate across jurisdictions creates some level of international regulatory
competition to attract business. The nation with the most robust presence
of banks will find that its corporations have cheaper access to capital
than nations where the banking sector is weaker. Therefore, shifts in a
nation’s banking law affect all businesses, not just the banking
businesses. In this light, it is easy to see why maintaining and increasing
the strength of the U.S. economy requires a robust U.S. corporate sector,
and thus a robust U.S. banking sector. The U.S. government does not
want banks to flee the U.S. for England, the EU, or Asia. From the U.S.’s
standpoint, therefore, it is imperative that U.S. legislation not
disadvantage U.S. banks compared to their European and Asian
counterparts, because then business would flow from the former to the
latter.33
Returning to a Glass-Steagall-style regulation would have substantial
negative effects on the banking industry. For example, if Congress were
to reenact Glass-Steagall through the proposed (but defeated) Banking
Integrity Act of 2009, Bank of America would be forced to sell the
brokerage unit of Merrill Lynch,which it bought through a governmentorchestrated sale.34 This would have three major consequences. The first
is intuitive: Bank of America would lose a huge advantage it gained over
other U.S. and (more importantly) foreign financial institutions—the
acquisition of a powerful brokerage business. Second, it would force the
sale in a recessionary period, which could lead to systemic effects and
further hurt a troubled global financial system.35 Third, it would make the
U.S. government look foolish because the government had just finished
engineering not only the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America, but
also the sale of Bear Stearns to J. P. Morgan, and others. Returning to
Glass-Steagall would illegalize those combinations and force their
undoing.36
33
It may be said that this point imputes a "protectionist" or "neomercantilist" agenda to the
U.S. government in its regulatory treatment of U.S. banks. The U.S. government is doing nothing,
however, to affect the regulatory regimes to which U.S.-based banks are subjected in their operations
in foreign nations, nor is it discriminating against foreign banks in their regulatory treatment in the
U.S. (compared with the domestic regulatory treatment of U.S. banks). Rather than protecting U.S.
banks against competition from foreign banks, the U.S. is trying to provide a total package
(regulatory regime being just one component of what an international bank considers in choosing
where to base its business) that is competitive with. if not outrightly victorious over, the packages
offered by other nations. The U.S. is not trying to help its own banks compete against foreign banks;
the U.S. itself is competing as a nation against foreign nations for the home-basing and business of
international banks.
34
See Cyrus Sanati, Yearning for Glass-Steagall on Capitol Hill,N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan.
22, 2010, 3:17 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/yearning-for-glass-steagall-on-capitolhill ("Under the Volcker Rule, for example, Bank of America would still be able to keep Merrill
Lynch’s brokerage services and investment banking units. But if Glass-Steagall were to return, Bank
of America would need to sell virtually all of Merrill Lynch and return to being just a retail bank.”).
35
Id. (“‘I think introducing Glass-Steagall now across the board in a weak economy would be
counterproductive because you would force sales and the like,’’ said Representative Barney Frank of
Massachusetts, the Democratic chairman of the House Financial Services Committee and a supporter
of the president’’s plan.").
36
Id. (“That major change is too much for some lawmakers to swallow, especially after the
government helped orchestrate Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch in the first place in
2009 — not to mention JPMorgan Chase’s takeover of Bear Stearns earlier in the year.”).
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While it seems that Congress was focused on re-regulating the
financial industry in the same vein as Glass-Steagall, for the
aforementioned reasons, it is also apparent that a purely structure-based
regulatory regime—one which focuses on the structure of financial
institutions as commercial banks, investment banks, insurers, etc.—
would not be feasible in 2011.37 The Obama administration felt that the
system had grown too structurally complex and that broad structural
regulation unilaterally undertaken by the U.S. government would be
ignorant of many of the positive developments and unchangeable
realities of the modern global financial system. 38 The government opted
instead for stronger capital requirements under the Basel III international
banking standard,39 hoping to create a larger equity cushion for banks,
and hoping for the Volcker Rule to eliminate the pernicious conflicts of
interest that Glass-Steagall had sought to eradicate.40
D. The Volcker Rule as an Implementation of Glass-Steagall Regulation
Principles
The Volcker Rule, codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1851, has regulatory
ambitions very similar to the Glass-Steagall Act. The Volcker Rule
proceeds not on a structural basis (saying what commercial banks can or
cannot own) but rather on an “activities” basis (saying what commercial
banks can or cannot do). The Volcker Rule’’s proprietary trading
provisions seek to limit the types of trades that so-called “banking
entities” are able to make for their own accounts in an effort to prevent
these institutions from relying on the federal backstop41 and using
depositor money to make proprietary financial bets.42 Moreover,
taxpayers do not want to be responsible for the bailout of a financial
institution that has brought itself to financial calamity because of
proprietary trading activities, whether undertaken with the traders’
reliance on the federal backstop (and thus exposure to the moral hazard)
37

See supra text accompanying notes 31-44.
Michael Hirsh, An Odd Post-Crash Couple, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 14, 2009),
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/12/14/an-odd-post-crash-couple.html.
Obama administration officials have dismissed the idea that the financial sector should or can
be changed in more fundamental ways than they are now proposing. You can’t turn back the clock,
they say...’I think going back to Glass-Steagall would be like going back to the Walkman,’ says one
senior Treasury official.
Reinstituting Glass-Steagall would be almost akin to unscrambling an egg. By the time it was
formally repealed in 1999, commercial banks like Citigroup had been moving gradually into
investment banking for nearly two decades. Glass-Steagall had come under continual pressure as
traditional commercial banks sought to follow their old clients into the capital markets, issuing
stocks and bonds instead of borrowing the old way. Innovators like JPMorgan had gone global while
the law still reigned at home, becoming big in the Euromarkets. Id.
39
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for
More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems (Dec. 2010, revised June 2011), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [hereinafter Basel III].
40
Id.
41
This federal backstop is another term for the “Discount Window” the Federal Reserve makes
available to banks for inexpensive intraday loans. See supra note 1.
42
12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(A) et. seq.
38
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or not. Taxpayers would be responsible for financial contribution to the
banking entities, however, through the U.S. government’s commitments
under the FDIC.
While Glass-Steagall focused on the structure of banks and
prohibited combinations of commercial banks with investment banks or
insurance companies (among other types of financial institutions), the
Volcker Rule proceeds by limiting the activities of “banking entities.”
This begs the question of what exactly is a banking entity? Subsection
(h)(1) of the Volcker Rule bases its definition of “banking entity” on the
definition of “insured depository institution” under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.§ 1813).43
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines “insured depository
institution” as “any bank or savings association the deposits of which are
insured by the Corporation pursuant to this Act [12 U.S.C. §§ 1811 et
seq.].”44 This definition conforms to the rationale stated earlier for the
enactment of the Volcker Rule: to prohibit entities with access to deposit
insurance from taking proprietary bets using deposits while relying on a
federal government backstop. In this way, the Volcker Rule tracks GlassSteagall as a reaction to the risk-taking activities of deposit-taking banks.
The focus on the FDIC shows that the government is concerned
mainly with regulating risk-taking by banks to which the U.S. taxpayer
provides protection in the event of insolvency. This includes traditional
commercial banks with securities and brokerage businesses, such as
Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, etc. But what about
the two major Wall Street investment firms, Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley, which were not traditionally commercial, deposit-taking
institutions with FDIC insurance? The Volcker Rule expands upon the
definition in § 1813 by also including institutions which control insured
depository institutions.45 Because Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley
became Bank Holding Companies during the financial crisis of 2008 and
43

12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1):
(1) Banking entity. The term "banking entity" means any insured depository institution
(as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. § 1813)), any company that
controls an insured depository institution, or that is treated as a bank holding company for purposes
of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978, and any affiliate or subsidiary of any such
entity. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "insured depository institution" does not include an
institution that functions solely in a trust or fiduciary capacity, if-(A) all or substantially all of the deposits of such institution are in trust funds and are
received in a bona fide fiduciary capacity;
(B) no deposits of such institution which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation are offered or marketed by or through an affiliate of such institution;
(C) such institution does not accept demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may
withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third parties or others or make commercial
loans; and
(D) such institution does not-(i) obtain payment or payment related services from any Federal Reserve bank,
including any service referred to in section 11A of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 248a); or
(ii) exercise discount or borrowing privileges pursuant to section 19(b)(7) of the
Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 461(b)(7)).
44
12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2).
45
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1).
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now control insured depository institutions under the 12 U.S.C. §
1813(c)(2) definition,46 they themselves are now within the purview of
the Volcker Rule as “banking entities” under the 12 U.S.C § 1851(h)(1)
definition. Goldman and Morgan were the last two “independent
investment banks” on Wall Street before their conversion to Bank
Holding Companies and submission to regulation by the Federal
Reserve.47 After their conversion, all of Wall Street’s major players had
access to the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window, which strikes many as
somewhat of a windfall. However, because access to the Discount
Window facility requires all of the banks to be or control insured
depository institutions,48 the major banks and bank holding companies all
fall within the Volcker Rule’s definition of a “banking entity” and are
thus subject to its restrictions.
However, as stated before, the U.S. government has an interest in
enabling its banks to compete on an international scale. Doing this
requires avoiding the imposition of restrictive regulation on domestic
banks while allowing foreign banks unfettered access to the U.S.
financial system. To maintain an even playing field, U.S. branches of
foreign banks qualify as “banking entities” under the Volcker Rule and
are subject to the same restrictions as their U.S. counterparts. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Act contains a provision which reads, “The
term ‘insured depository institution’ includes any uninsured branch or
agency of a foreign bank or a commercial lending company owned or
controlled by a foreign bank for the purposes of section 1818 of this title
[12 U.S.C.S. § 1818].”49 Thus, the U.S. branches of foreign banks (such
as UBS, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Nomura, Mizuho, etc.) are
banking entities under the Volcker Rule’s definition in 12 U.S.C. §
1851(h)(1).
In enacting the Volcker Rule, Congress seemed to have been trying
to lasso in the same group of entities as it did when enacting the GlassSteagall Act. In both pieces of financial legislation, Congress sought to
place restrictions on the activities of deposit-taking banks operating in
the United States and whose deposits would be backstopped by the U.S.
government. Banks with this sort of backstop would be subject to a
moral hazard: reliance on federal insurance of their deposits could
artificially enlarge the banks’ appetites for risk, to their own detriment
and that of the global financial system. The Glass-Steagall Act and the
Volcker Rule aimed to constrain, if not eliminate, the influence of this
46
As Goldman and Morgan Shift, a Wall St. Era Ends,N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 21, 2008,
9:35PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/goldman-morgan-to-become-bank-holdingcompanies. ("In its statement, Goldman said that it would become the nation’s fourth-largest bank
holding company, with its small existing deposit-taking units to be rolled into GS Bank USA.
Morgan Stanley will convert its Utah industrial bank into a deposit-taking national bank, to be called
Morgan Stanley Bank.").
47
Id. ("Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the last two independent investment banks, will
become bank holding companies, the Federal Reserve said Sunday night, a move that will
fundamentally alter the landscape of Wall Street.").
48
12 U.S.C. § 1811.
49
12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(3).
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moral hazard. However, they went about their mission in separate ways.
Glass-Steagall took a structural approach, as discussed.50 It chalked out
categories of entities, such as commercial banks, investment banks,
insurance companies, etc., and prevented combinations between
commercial banks and others.51 The Volcker Rule does not focus on
structure. It defines only one set of entities with which it is concerned:
the “banking entities” discussed above. The Volcker Rule regulates the
entities’ activities, designating as “impermissible” those activities which
Congress suspects would give rise to a moral hazard problem for the
banking entity.52
The Volcker Rule takes a two-pronged approach in regulating the
activities of banking entities. Its title reads, “Prohibitions on proprietary
trading and certain relationships with hedge funds and private equity
funds.”53 The first prong deals with proprietary trading activities of
banking entities and prong two focuses on the activities of banking
entities in relation to hedge funds and private equity funds. For the sake
of maintaining a tight focus, this article shall focus solely on the
prohibition of proprietary trading.
III. THE ROLE OF PROPRIETARY TRADING IN THE 2008 FINANCIAL
CRISIS
A. What is Proprietary Trading?
The Volcker Rule defines “proprietary trading” in the following
manner:
The term “proprietary trading,” when used with respect to a banking
entity or nonbank financial company supervised by the Board, means
engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking entity
or nonbank financial company supervised by the Board in any
transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of,
any security, any derivative, any contract of sale of a commodity for
future delivery, any option on any such security, derivative, or
contract, or any other security or financial instrument that the
appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may,
by rule as provided in subsection (b)(2), determine.54
This definition lays the foundation for what ultimately becomes a web of
defined terms used to circumscribe the trading activities that Congress
wished to prohibit. It is important to unpack these terms piece by piece.
50

12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994); see supra pp. 10-13.
Id.
52
12 U.S.C. § 1851 (h)(4).
53
12 U.S.C. § 1851.
54
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4).
51
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The second clause of the first sentence, “when used with respect to a
banking entity or nonbank financial company supervised by the
Board,”55 states the two classes of entities for which the term
“proprietary trading” shall be defined by the definition in 12 U.S.C. §
1851(h)(4). For entities that are neither banking entities nor nonbank
financial companies supervised by the Board (such as foreign banks
doing business in foreign territories), the term proprietary trading is not
defined under the definition in 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4). Furthermore, it
bears mentioning that while this definition of the term “proprietary
trading” is the same with respect to nonbank financial companies
supervised by the Board56 as it is to banking entities,57it does not mean
that proprietary trading is prohibited for nonbank financial companies
supervised by the Board. Banking entities cannot engage in proprietary
trading,58but nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board
can.They are merely subject to more stringent capital requirements and
quantitative limits with regard to their proprietary trading activities.59
The next important phrase is “engaging as a principal.”60Since the
statute does not further define the term,it is necessary to look to industry
definitions. The investment encyclopedia Investopedia defines
“principal” with regard to trading as “[t]he main party to a transaction,
acting as either a buyer or seller for his/her own account and risk.” 61 It is
commonly defined in opposition to the term “agent,” which Investopedia
defines as “[a]n individual or firm that places securities transactions for
clients.”62 With the term “engaging as a principal,” Congress is targeting
traders who are trading on their own impetus and for their own profit, not
to match a customer order, or “customer flow” as it is called on trading
floors.
The phrase which follows is “for the trading account of the banking
entity or nonbank financial company...”63 The term “trading account” is
further defined in the following manner:
The term “trading account” means any account used for acquiring or
taking positions in the securities and instruments described in
paragraph (4) principally for the purpose of selling in the near term
(or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from shortterm price movements), and any such other accounts as the
appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange

55

Id.
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(3).
57
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1).
58
12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(A).
59
12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2).
60
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4).
61
Principal, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ p/principal.asp (last visited
Oct. 20, 2011).
62
Agent, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ a/agent.asp (last visited Oct. 20,
2011).
63
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4).
56
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Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may,
by rule as provided in subsection (b)(2), determine.64
This definition, like the previous one, deserves some unpacking in
order to make sense of the implications for the Volcker Rule.The heart of
this definition is the phrase “principally for the purpose of selling in the
near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from
short-term price movements)...”65 First, “the near term” must be defined.
The statute does not define it. Instead, it is presumably up to the
regulatory bodies (i.e., the Federal Reserve, SEC, and CFTC) to
determine. How it is defined will significantly impact the strength of the
Volcker Rule.
The same goes for the phrase “profit from short-term price
movements.”66 What is a short-term price movement? Also, what does
“profit from” mean? An investment bought and held for five years still
accumulates wealth with each “short term” upwards price movement
because, if they last, these price movements become long-term price
movements. Does “profit[ing] from” require a sale or an exercise? If so,
is the required action different across different asset classes? How these
terms are defined will impact the success of the Volcker Rule in policing
the trading activities of Wall Street banks.
Two lines of analysis emerge from the definition of trading account
in the Volcker Rule: 1) trading account as defined by the length of
security-holding, and 2) trading account as defined by profiting from
short-term movement in securities. As shall be demonstrated, the finance
world’s understanding of the term has clearly influenced the definition of
“trading account” in the Volcker Rule. Although the two are not the
same, it seems as though the Volcker Rule is proceeding on the same two
lines as Wall Street in distinguishing a trading account from the other
main type of securities account—an investment account. Investopedia
defines “trading account” as “[a]n account held at a financial institution
and administered by an investment dealer that the account holder uses to
employ a trading strategy rather than a buy-and-hold investment
strategy.”67 The focus of the industry’s definition is whether the
investments in the account are “buy-and-hold.” A “buy-and-hold”
investment strategy is defined by Investopedia as “[a] passive investment
strategy in which an investor buys stocks and holds them for a long
period of time, regardless of fluctuations in the market. An investor who
employs a buy-and-hold strategy actively selects stocks, but once in a
position, is not concerned with short-term price movements and technical
indicators.”68
64

12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6).
Id.
Id.
67
Trading Account, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tradingaccount. asp
(last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
68
Buy and Hold, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ b/buyandhold.asp (last
visited Oct. 20, 2011).
65
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This definition turns on two factors. The first factor is temporality:
strategies executed from an investment account involve holding a
security for a “long period of time.”69 Trading accounts are
distinguishable from investment accounts because they do not involve
long-term-hold strategies. This ambiguous factor presents difficulties in
maintaining clear distinctions between investment and trading accounts
because there is no set length of time that divides them. The second
factor isbinary: passive or active investing. Investment accounts are
defined as passive investing, whereas trading accounts are those with
which traders execute active strategies. These non-passive strategies
involve rigorous risk monitoring and sometimes frequent trading to
manage and hedge that risk. Again, the difficulty is in creating a clear
standard to distinguish trading accounts from investment accounts vis-àvis the amount of trading activity (as a proxy for active versus passive
investing).
B. How Did Proprietary Trading Play a Role in the Financial Crisis of
2008?
Wall Street firms boomed in the mid-2000s, and Goldman Sachs
provides an excellent case study of the importance of trading in the
boom: “of the $6.7 billion [Goldman] earned before taxes [in
2004]…75% came from trading and investments like its 15.5% stake in
Archipelago.”70 If Wall Street in the mid-2000s was a car, trading was
certainly its engine. But how much horsepower is too much horsepower?
How far should firm-funded trading go? The following two examples of
proprietary trading illustrate the irresponsible and risk-blind nature of the
practice as it existed in the years leading up to the financial crisis.
In an article appearing in Time magazine, former Lehman Brothers
bond trader, Lawrence McDonald, recounts his experience of meeting a
college-junior-level intern. During his winter break, this intern was
trading derivatives for Lehman Brothers out of his $150 million book
funded by the firm.71 Broker-dealers were apparently giving college
students millions of dollars to engage in proprietary trading during their
school breaks.72 The article goes on to list the proprietary trading losses
of various firms, noting that Lehman lost $32 billion from proprietary
trading and principal transactions.73 Lehman Brothers subsequently
collapsed and is currently in bankruptcy.74
69

Id.
Justin Fox, Goldman: We Run Wall Street, CNN MONEY (May 16, 2005),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2005/05/16/8260146/index.htm.
71
Stephen Gamdel, Is Proprietary Trading Too Wild for Wall Street?, TIME (Feb. 5, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1960565,00.html.
72
While it is true that Lehman Brothers would not be considered a "banking entity" under the
Volcker Rule definition, all of the surviving major Wall Street banks are now banking entities with
deposit-taking institutions, and so the point is moot in the post-crash period.
73
Gamdel, supra note 71.
74
Investopedia Staff, Case Study: The Collapse of Lehman Brothers,INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 2,
2009), http://www.investopedia.com/ articles/economics/09/lehman-brothers-collapse.asp.
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In addition to Lehman Brothers, several other banks faced serious
losses due to proprietary trading. Merrill Lynch lost close to $20 billion
from its proprietary collateralized debt obligation (CDO) bets.75 Its
liquidity threatened and its future uncertain, Merrill Lynch was sold to
Bank of America in September 2008 at a 40% discount to its share price
in May of that year.76 Morgan Stanley lost $4 billion from proprietary
trading in the fourth quarter of 2007 alone.77 A single Morgan Stanley
trader, Howard Hubler, accounted for approximately $9 billion in the
firm’s proprietary trading losses.78 One year later, Morgan Stanley’s
application to become a Bank Holding Company was approved by the
Federal Reserve Board amidst one of the worst months for the solvency
of financial institutions in the history of modern banking. 79 Citigroup lost
nearly $15 billion on CDO bets.80 In February 2009, the U.S. government
exchanged $25 billion in emergency bailout funds for a 36% equity stake
in the company.81
When all the dust settled, a report by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office showed that “during [the] five quarters spanning
the financial crisis…proprietary trading accounted for $15.8 billion in
losses” at the six largest bank holding companies.82 Let that serve as a
succinct summary of the role of proprietary trading in the financial crisis
of 2008.
C. Public Reaction to Proprietary Trading, the Financial Crisis, and the
Volcker Rule
It is not difficult to imagine that the actions of Wall Street traders,
viewed by many as the cause of the 2008 financial crisis, angered the
average American citizen. As commanded by subsection (b) of the
Volcker Rule, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)
conducted a comment period from the date of passage of the Dodd-Frank

75

Gamdel, supra note 71.
Charlie Gasparino, Bank of America to Buy Merrill Lynch for $50 Billion, CNBC (Sept. 14,
2008,
7:42
PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/26708319/Bank_of_America_to_Buy_Merrill_Lynch_for_50_Billion.
77
Gamdel, supra note 71.
78
Max Abelson, Howie Hubler of New Jersey: The Return of a Subprime Villain, THE N. Y.
OBSERVER (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.observer.com/2010/wall-street/howie-hubler-new-jerseyreturn-subprime-villain.
79
Press Release, Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley Granted Federal Bank Holding Company
Status by U.S.
Federal Reserve Board
of
Governors,
(Sept. 21, 2008),
http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/6933.html.
80
Gamdel, supra note 71.
81
See U.S. Will Boost Stake in Citigroup to 36%, CNBC (Feb. 27, 2009, 1:01:58 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29421397/ns/business-consumer_news. But seeU.S. Treasury Plans
to Sell Citigroup Common Shares in 2010, BLOOMBERG BUS. W. (Mar. 29, 2010),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-29/u-s-treasury-plans-to-sell-citigroup-commonshares-in-2010.html (The US government would go on to sell the securities for a significant profit
from its original cost basis for acquisition of the shares, thus earning the taxpayer a tidy profit from
the bailout).
82
Scott Patterson & Victoria McGrane, The Multibillion-Dollar Leak, THE WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204294504576615382298044922.html.
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Act (July 25, 2010) until November 5, 2010.83 Many of the comments
came from everyday American citizens who were outraged that Wall
Street traders were able to take on risk from proprietary trading while
their institutions held backstops from the federal government (i.e., the
U.S. taxpayer).84 These individuals perhaps viewed a lax regulatory
regime as an implicit governmental sanction for proprietary trading and
financial risk-taking, and demanded the strict implementation of the
Volcker Rule to prevent future occurrences of the same. For example, a
commenter wrote, “institute the Volker [sic] rule and more you weasels.
the banks have been allowed to enslave Americans for too long. stop
[sic] it now do your regulatory jobs.pass [sic] and enforce laws that put
the American people first, not banks and corporations. [T]homas Tague,
voter.”85Such comments may seem firebrand, but they are rather
representative (at least in sentiment if not in rhetoric), of the statements
submitted to the FSOC’s request for comment on the Volcker Rule.
Popular opinion—at least as reflected by the private citizen comments
delivered to the FSOC—seems to view the Volcker Rule as an apt and
necessary solution for the perceived problem of unchecked proprietary
trading by traders at banking entities.
Currently, the Volcker Rule comes under fire as a symbolic but
ultimately meaningless piece of legislation, enacted solely to quell the
sort of public outcry quoted above while actually doing little to prevent
the activities and subsequent harm it purports to prevent.86 As discussed
briefly above and in more depth below, the definition of “proprietary
trading” is complex and contingent upon the definitions given to many
other terms (e.g., “trading account,” “near term,” etc.). Depending on
how the terms are defined, the Volcker Rule may have strong or weak
effects with regards to preventing firms from making proprietary bets.
While the U.S. constituency may believe that the Volcker Rule
represents the government taking a strong step towards reining in the
excesses of Wall Street power, it may be just another example of an
“appease and deceive” strategy by lawmakers torn between the populist
outcries of their constituents and the allure of Wall Street’s lobbyists.

83

12 U.S.C. § 1851(b) (2010).
See infra note 85.
85
Comment from Thomas Tague, public citizen member,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-1372 (last visited Sept. 26,
2011). Another commenter, Louis Spain, Jr., wrote, "If anything is done other than following the
Volcker Rule, I would have to suspect that the people in your organization are domestic terrorists
working secretly for the Taliban. We now know that the financial institutions in this country may as
well be. Predatory, irresponsible and just plain incompetence don’t even begin to descrbe the
behavior of the finanical instry [sic] in this country. Do not disappoint us on this!" Comment from
Louis Spain, Jr., Personal, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-1378
(last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
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See, e.g., Kid Dynamite, More Thoughts on the Volcker Rule, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 5,
2010), http://seekingalpha.com/article/186862-more-thoughts-on-the-volcker-rule.
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IV. THE INTERPLAY OF PROPRIETARY TRADING AND PERMITTED
ACTIVITIES
A. What are “Permitted Activities?”
Title 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1) explicitly permits certain activities,
despite the general prohibition on proprietary trading and investments in
hedge funds and private equity funds.87 The relevant classes of permitted
activities in the U.S. or to U.S. banks88 are as follows:


Trading in U.S. Government obligations, including obligations of the
States, municipalities, and obligations of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and Ginnie Mae.89
 Trading “in connection with underwriting or market-making-related
activities, to [an] extent …not to exceed the reasonably expected
near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties.”90
 “Risk-mitigating hedging activities … related to individual or
aggregated positions, contracts, or other holdings of a banking entity
that are designed to reduce the specific risks to the banking entity in
connection with and related to such positions, contracts, or other
holdings.”91
 Transactions on behalf of customers.92
 Other trading activities that the Federal Reserve, SEC, and CFTC
determine93 would promote and protect the safety and soundness of
the banking entity and the financial stability of the United States.94
The first point, (d)(1)(A), allows for attending to U.S. government
obligations. This allowance seems logical because Congress does not
want to impair the liquidity of markets on which the solvency of the U.S.
government depends. Banking entities are therefore allowed to make
proprietary trades (“prop trade”) in treasury bills, state bonds, muni
bonds, Ginnie bonds (which are backed by the full faith and credit of the
U.S. government),95 and Fannie and Freddie bonds (which are backed by
the guarantee of the respective corporations).96 Mortgage-backed
87

12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1) (2010).
§ 1851(d)(1)(H) This section carves out proprietary trading conducted entirely outside the
US by banking entities that are not organized within the US or controlled by any banking entity
organized within the US. Query: Why would the Federal Reserve Board, SEC or CFTC have
jurisdiction over the transaction anyhow? Perhaps because the transaction could involve securities
registered under the ‘33 Act and so the SEC has jurisdiction over transactions in them? However,
this does not mean that the Volcker Rule, which is US federal banking law, applies.
89
§ 1851(d)(1)(A).
90
§ 1851(d)(1)(B).
91
§ 1851(d)(1)(C).
92
§ 1851(d)(1)(D).
93
§ 1851(d)(1)(J) (pursuant to their rulemaking authority under subsection (b)(2)).
94
§ 1851(d)(1)(J).
95
Full Faith and Credit, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/full-faithcredit.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
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Mortgage-Backed Securities, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ mortgagesecurities.htm
(last modified July 23, 2010).
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securities (MBS) issued by Ginnie, Fannie, and Freddie are also
permissible because they are issued by the agencies themselves, not
securitization trusts which may not fall into the (d)(1)(A) safe harbor.97
The second point, (d)(1)(B), preserves the ability of banks to
undertake securities trading activities with regards to their investment
banking arms’ underwriting activities. Congress likely wanted to ensure
that corporations’ access to the capital markets was not disrupted by
regulation seeking to curb excessive risk-taking in proprietary trading.
Since Congress likely did not seek to restrict securities trading related to
IPOs and other underwriting activity, it seems appropriate that it is
included in the (d)(1) safe harbor.
In addition to allowing underwriting activities, (d)(1)(B) also permits
trading in connection with market-making-related activities. Marketmaking, however, is a bit trickier. Investopedia explains “making a
market” as “[a]n action whereby a dealer stands by ready, willing and
able to buy or sell a particular security at the quoted bid and ask price.”98
To perform this task, a trader must have an inventory of the securities of
the type for which he or she is making a market. Investopedia defines
“Market Maker” as a broker-dealer firm that accepts the risk of holding a
certain number of shares of a particular security in order to facilitate
trading in that security. Each market maker competes for customer order
flow by displaying buy and sell quotations for a guaranteed number of
shares. Once an order is received, the market maker immediately sells
from its own inventory or seeks an offsetting order. This process takes
place in mere seconds.99
If a trader anticipates demand for a security and is tasked with
making a market in it, he or she will need to stock up on inventory to
sell. This is fundamental market-making. However, a bank uses its own
capital to acquire securities and place them in a trading account, thereby
hoping to gain from the transaction. This is very close to the line
demarcating permitted activity from proprietary trading, an issue
addressed later in this Article.100
Third, (d)(1)(C) allows traders to undertake risk-mitigating hedging
on an individual or aggregate basis. Traders may therefore hedge
individual securities transactions or entire portfolios of securities.
Hedging plays an incredibly important role in trading because it allows
traders to lock in profits and protect themselves from declines in the
97
See generally FANNIEMAE, GUARANTEED MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES 1
(Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.efanniemae.com/syndicated/documents/
mbs/mbspros/MF_October_1_2010.pdf (prospectus indicating that Fannie issues the MBS directly,
not through a securitization trust); WELCOME TO THE GINNIE MAE INVESTORS’ HOME PAGE,
GINNIEMAE.GOV, http://www.ginniemae.gov/investors/investors.asp?subTitle=
Investorshttp://www.ginniemae.gov/investors/investors.asp?subTitle=Investorshttp://www.ginniema
e.gov/investors/investors.asp?subTitle=Investors (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
98
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INVESTOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/
makeamarket.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
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prices of assets they hold in inventory. For instance, suppose that a trader
holds a pile of illiquid agency mortgage bonds.101 Maybe he cannot sell
them because there is not much of a market,102 or he does not want to sell
them because he anticipates a customer order.103 A risk-mitigating
hedging activity would be to sell TBAs,104 which would cancel out much
of the interest rate risk of holding the bonds.
The fourth point, (d)(1)(D), indicates that transactions on behalf of
customers are permissible, and it also relates to the second point,
(d)(1)(B). If the trader at a banking entity gets an order and does not have
the securities in inventory, Congress wants him to be able to execute the
order on the market for the customer. The trader is expressly enabled to
do this under (d)(1)(D).
The fifth point, (d)(1)(J), is a catch-all provision that gives the
regulatory agencies power to determine whether they should permit other
types of transactions. Provisions such as this are important because
agencies can act much more swiftly than Congress. Should something in
the Volcker Rule cause calamity in the financial markets, the government
would need to act immediately. Thus, if a certain type of trade is
necessary for financial stability but is proprietary in nature, and does not
qualify under the permitted activity safe harbors (and thus is prohibited
by the Volcker Rule) then the Federal Reserve, SEC, and CFTC are
given the power to allow that type of trade, and they would be able to
grant the exception in a relatively short amount of time.
Congress has also included a catch-all clause that allows the
regulatory agencies to prohibit, under certain circumstances, any of the
permitted activities under 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1), and delineates the
reasons for when such a prohibition would be appropriate.
Section1851(d)(2) states that the aforementioned “permitted activities”
would not be permitted if they trigger any of the following conditions:




The transaction involves or results in a material conflict of interest
between the banking entity and its clients, customers, or
counterparties. Each agency has the authority, granted by subsection
(b)(2) of 12 U.S.C. §1851, to define “material conflict of interest.”105
The transaction would expose the banking entity to high risk assets
or involve the banking entity in high risk trading strategies. “High
risk assets” and “high risk trading strategies” are also terms that shall
be defined by the appropriate agencies, under the authority of
subsection (b)(2) of 12 U.S.C. § 1851.106
101
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Congress wants the trader to hold the bonds because this encourages market liquidity for the
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The transaction would pose a threat to the safety and soundness of
the banking entity.107
The transaction would pose a threat to the financial stability of the
United States.108

It appears that the regulatory agencies have wide latitude in
determining whether to permit or prohibit transactions, and to prescribe
the lines by which one makes that determination. Making the Volcker
Rule effective will require an active policing of transactions by the
regulatory agencies to make sure that banking entities are not masking
proprietary and impermissible transactions under banners of
permissibility such as “market making” or “on behalf of a customer,” etc.
B. How Can Banking Entities Disguise Proprietary Trading as a
“Permitted Activity?”
Banking entities may disguise impermissible proprietary trading as a
“permitted activity” in a variety of ways. Entities may count the activity
as market making or base it on customer flow. Indeed, Goldman Sachs
has moved much of its proprietary trading staff to its Asset Management
division and changed the name from Proprietary Trading to Client
Trading.109 Suppose a trader deals in Treasury notes and bonds. A
customer, hedge fund Alpha, comes to the trader and wants to buy $10
million in Treasury long bonds. The trader believes that hedge funds
Beta and Gamma, two other customers, will come to him with similar
orders, so he buys $30 million in the bonds, fills Alpha’s order, and
keeps $20 million in inventory. The price of the bonds rises and then
Beta and Gamma come knocking, each with the same order for $10
million. The trader sells out his inventory, and profits not just from the
bid-offer spread (which are his profits from providing the liquidity), but
also from the price rise in the bonds while held in inventory. The
question arises: is this proprietary trading?
An article in The Atlantic by Daniel Indiviglio poses a similar
hypothetical.110
This year, for example, several large insurance companies
approached Goldman Sachs, looking to bet that the markets would
not stay quiet. Goldman gladly took the other side of the trades, but
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when the markets turned choppy in May, the firm was caught short
and quickly lost $250 million.
The “other side” of the bet is what might have been considered
prop trading. But in this case, Goldman was fulfilling the order of a
client, so it can also be classified as a case of the bank acting as a
market maker. The question, then, is whether we should be outraged
if banks are still able to make bets for their own profit if it is in the
context of making a market for a client.111
The example above begs the question of whether this is proprietary
trading. The answer probably lies somewhere in the definition of
“reasonably expected near term demands of clients...”112 The trader’s
activities, to fall within the safe harbor of (d)(1)(B), must only keep the
bonds in inventory within the reasonably expected near-term demand of
clients. However, the statute does not specify the length of “near term.”
In reality, it depends on the liquidity of the market. For treasuries, it
should be a short duration. For something highly illiquid, where the
trader must act as principal, the asset should be allowed to remain on the
trader’s books longer.
The key challenges in regulating this aspect of the Volcker Rule and
trading are: a) the amount of the asset that the trader should be allowed to
keep as inventory, and b) the duration for which inventory should be
allowed to be held. Goldman’s activity, falling more closely under
(d)(1)(D)’s exception for customer-based orders, basically allows a
banking entity to prop trade so long as someone else initiates the trade. A
possible needed restriction here might require banking entities to not
solicit another entity to “make a trade” with the bank that the bank
wanted to make in the first place.
Traders may also disguise proprietary trading by masking their
positions as simply hedges of permitted trades, though in truth the
‘hedge’ position is actually their real purpose. For instance, if a trader
wants to pick up some derivatives, he can take on an interest rate swap as
a hedge for a permitted position on Fannie or Freddie MBS. As long as
the trader can show that he purchased the interest rates’ derivatives to
offset his mortgage positions, then he can engage in mortgage arbitrage
under (d)(1)(C). He only has to show that the IR swap position was “in
connection with and related to” the MBS position and that he chose the
IR swap position to reduce risk to the banking entity.113 The choice of a
complicated “MBS hedged by IR swap” illustrates an important point:
when considering this trade, the notional amounts are not very relevant.
When hedging the MBS, simply buying a notional amount of the IR
swap hedge does not make sense. Traders instead look to facets such as
duration and convexity and hedge with respect to those. A trader could
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demonstrate that an MBS position is hedged by an IR swap position
because it is duration-neutral or convexity-neutral (and thus permissible
under (d)(1)(C)), and yet still have an IR swap position that is notionally
larger than the MBS position it is supposed to be hedging.
V.

A DEFINITIONAL SOLUTION: DRAWING LINES IN A SANDSTORM

Regulators use definitions to draw lines in the sand to create clear
guidelines for regulated entities to follow. But in the complex
environment of sales and trading, regulators have to draw lines in a
sandstorm—a difficult and fruitless process.
A. Trading Accounts Versus Investment Accounts
First, the law needs a definition that will provide a clear distinction
between trading and investment accounts. Making proprietary trading
impermissible when conducted in trading accounts creates an incentive
to shift proprietary operations over to investment accounts, if possible. A
caveat here: how an account is defined—whether as a trading account or
investment account—has consequences for the bank balance sheet
because of the way in which it is accounted. Investment accounts,
because of their long-term-hold strategy, are marked under book value
accounting rules.114 Trading accounts, on the other hand, fall under markto-market rules as per the standards in FASB Statement 157.115 So, while
proprietary trading may be conducted out of investment accounts
because it is only prohibited for trading accounts, these sorts of
investments will appear differently in the banking entity’s financial
statements and may pose a problem for moving certain activities from
trading accounts to investment accounts. European and American
accounting standards boards have been at odds about how to account for
financial products in trading accounts, and this only complicates the
debate.116
Of greater concern in the trading account versus investment account
debate is the nature of the investments made in each account, and the
losses that result from them. If the definition of “trading account” turns
on the “near term” requirement, it will conveniently overlook illiquid
assets for which there is no constant market. If something trades every
three months or so, would its purchase be booked to a trading or
114
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investment account? If it is booked to anything other than a trading
account, it is permissible proprietary trading for purposes of the Volcker
Rule. Thus, the Volcker Rule does not police, and perhaps incentivizes,
undertaking principal investments in highly illiquid assets. This could be
highly detrimental for the financial health of those firms.
In response, David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital called out Lehman
Brothers for marking up its highly illiquid real estate investments it had
made on a proprietary basis.117 These investments were held in
investment accounts, not trading accounts. Because of their illiquid
nature they would still be permissible under the Volcker Rule. These
same investments turned out to be overvalued on Lehman’s books and
ultimately caused fatal losses for the firm.118 In light of that, “highly
detrimental” is an understatement; perhaps “catastrophically detrimental”
is more appropriate.
Considering the complexity of distinguishing between different
account-types and the potential for entities to circumvent the Volcker
Rule’s trading-account exclusion, it would be prudent to place
restrictions on proprietary trading in investment accounts as well. The
Federal Reserve, SEC, and CFTC have authority to widen the definition
of “trading account” under 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6), the provision which
defines “trading account,” and includes “any such other accounts as the
appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by
rule as provided in subsection (b)(2), determine.”119 A truly meaningful
restriction would be to remove the “account arbitrage” opportunity and
make proprietary trading impermissible regardless of the type of account
in which or for which it is done.
B. “Engaging as a Principal,” Market-Making and Customer Flow
The second definition required is that of “engaging as a principal.”
While this appears in the definition of proprietary trading in subsection
(h)(4), the term ties closely to the safe harbor for market-making
activities delineated in subsection (d)(1)(B). Essentially, proprietary
trading on a principal basis is impermissible unless it is part of marketmaking activities to meet customer flow.120 A clear standard is needed to
separate market-making from proprietary holding. That is, there needs to
be a clear difference illustrated between holding inventory to make a
market versus holding inventory to profit from an upward movement in
the asset price. Defining market-making as matching inventory to
customer order is not adequate, particularly with regard to volatile and/or
illiquid markets where traders would need to anticipate customer orders
117
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and purchase inventory in advance in order to stabilize the market and
provide liquidity.
The Financial Stability Oversight Council study on the Volcker Rule
has indicated that customer-flow metrics could be applicable for
determining whether a trader has taken proprietary positions that do not
correlate to appropriate customer flow.121 Many in the community have
flagged the idea as an intelligent solution.122 While this is a promising
idea, it bears mentioning that the agencies would need to collect data on
customer flow for a meaningful number of trading-books on a
meaningfully frequent basis to make the regulation relevant. The SEC,
for instance, would need to review the flow metrics of enough traders’
books frequently enough that it would be able to catch instances of
impermissible inventory-building where customer flow is lacking. To do
so for every trading book, at every “banking entity,” every quarter,
would produce a volume of data that the SEC may be unable to handle
and rigorously process. It could, however, be done on an audit basis.
Perhaps the best solution for this is to measure market liquidity and
compare it to inventory turnover. The Financial Stability Oversight
Committee suggests inventory metrics as part of their rigorous
compliance regime.123 The study states,
Inventory Turnover: This metric calculates the ratio of assets that
are transacted each day to assets that are retained in inventory. The
metric takes into account the need for market makers to hold
inventory (volume of retained assets), but relates it to the asset’s
observed customer demand (volume of transacted assets).
Impermissible proprietary trading seeks to profit from the
appreciation of an asset. Retaining assets well in excess of customer
demand may be an indicator that the trader is seeking to profit from
the appreciation of inventory. Conversely, market makers with a near
term goal of serving customers will acquire and sell (or, for some
instruments, hedge) within as short a timeframe as possible in order
to profit from the bid-ask spread.124
This is likely to be the best solution to the problem. The more liquid
a market is, the shorter the duration should be for which it is permissible
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for a trader to hold assets in connection with his “market-making”
function. For highly liquid assets, like equities, liquidity is easy to
measure: just look at the bid-ask spread. Something illiquid, like a
tranche of the Countrywide Alternative Loan Trust, might trade once
every few months or so. The equities trader should be required to “go
flat,” or have a clean slate of inventory, in a shorter period than the trader
in pieces of Countrywide’s Alt-A trust.
Issues of LIFO versus FIFO accounting are clearly factors here
which need to be sorted. LIFO accounting would make the most sense
because FIFO accounting would require a trader to sell completely out of
inventory in order to “go flat.” True market liquidity is a fairer measure
than customer demand. However, it is more difficult to measure, and the
volume of customer orders received by a desk may be a far more feasible
proxy.
One way to trick a system like the aforementioned, however, would
be to “churn” one’s inventory. In a highly liquid market, a trader’s
portfolio could have a high number of transactions that make it seem as
though a lot of market-making activity is taking place. However, the
trader could be masking a held proprietary position by making numerous
small market-making transactions and thus raising the appearance that
the book has “gone flat” when in fact a position is being held all along.
C. Hedging
Third, and finally, a definition of “in connection with and related to”
is required, as the phrase exists in the hedging safe harbor in subsection
(d)(1)(B). How does a trader demonstrate that a hedging position relates
to a permissible trading position? What is the close connection or
relation? Particularly, what will be the impact of the prohibition on
trading desks taking positions in assets outside of the desk’s coverage?
The financial law blog “Economics of Contempt” had a particularly good
insight on this matter:
If a bank wants to build up a proprietary position in equities, it’s not
going to do it from the MBS desk; it’s going to do it from an equities
desk. So there likely won’t be a deviation from the types of products
used on the desk. And in fact, sometimes trading desks do actually
use products for which they’re normally not approved as part of
legitimate hedging strategies. For example, a fixed-income desk
trying to hedge its largest counterparty exposure may have to resort
to buying puts if, say, they can’t buy enough CDS protection to
cover the counterparty exposure….125
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As stated in the earlier example of hedging an MBS trade with an IR
swap, normal Wall Street transaction hedges often occur outside of the
product lines of the asset being hedged. Barring desks from reaching
outside of their asset class would not prohibit proprietary trading as
much as it would diminish the banking entity’s ability to hedge its
positions. Regulators should want banks to hedge, as it mitigates risk of
loss on outstanding positions.
Prohibiting desks from going across product classes may also yield
further costs because a “central hedging coordinator” would be
necessary.126 For instance, an MBS trader who wanted to hedge an MBS
position with an IR swap, but could not because of regulations restricting
him from deviating from his asset class, would call the swap desk and
ask them to take on a swap position on their book to hedge his MBS
position held on his book. Eventually, it seems logical that some sort of a
“coordination desk” would arise out of the confusion to arrange crossbook hedges. The solution would be messy for banks and even messier
for regulators trying to figure out what is going on inside banks. Assetclass-based limitations seem like a bad idea for everyone involved.
Solutions that attempt to identify particular hedges for particular
transactions and bar all others would be counterproductive because they
would infringe on a trader’s ability to be creative and innovative as
products and product lines become more intricate and new sources of
risk emerge. Definitions based on notional amounts are meaningless
when considering hedges that exist to cover duration, convexity, or other
factors for which the straight face value of the asset is irrelevant.
In general, it seems that the definitional approach is unsuitable for
regulating hedging because the nature of the market and its structure
yield too many exceptions for any possible definition to be sensible and
effective. Hedging is what makes traders, and their creativity, valuable.
Limiting the tools available to traders in designing hedges strips away
much of the value from sales and trading as business lines for banking
entities. This subsequently reduces profit by reducing the number of
profitable opportunities available to the bank. Banks will be forced to
take on more risk to keep profit trading at prior levels, and shareholders
of banking entities should be unhappy with this. Frankly, everyone
should be unhappy with this.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Volcker Rule seems to do more to create busywork for federal
regulatory agencies than it does to meaningfully regulate the financial
industry. The loopholes and gaps in its definitions are too broad. The
banks and their lawyers have wide gaps through which to shuttle
proprietary trading disguised as any number of permitted activities. One
possible solution is to return to Glass-Stegall-style structure-based
126
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regulation, cleaving proprietary trading firms from investor adviser
firms.
As Michael Lewis wrote in a Bloomberg column, there is a simpler
solution for the problem the Volcker Rule sets out to solve:
...ban any sort of position-taking at the giant publicly owned banks.
To say, simply: You are no longer allowed to make bets in the same
stocks and bonds that you are selling to investors.
If that means that Goldman Sachs is no longer allowed to make
markets in corporate bonds, so be it. You can be Charles Schwab,
and advise investors; or you can be Citadel, and run trading
positions. But if you are Citadel you will be privately owned. And if
you blow up your firm, you will blow up yourself in the bargain.127
Lewis’s solution is brutal but not incomprehensible. It resonates with
the McCain-Cantwell proposal to reinstate the Glass-Stegall prohibition
on combinations of investment and commercial banks. As discussed
above, however, there are significant pressures against reverting to such
a system. Put simply, because of globalization, the financial services
industry as we know it has crossed that Rubicon. Many of the large firms
that function as both commercial and investment banks—the so-called
“banking entities”—are too vital to the health of the U.S. and global
economies to cleave them into separate parts: commercial bank from
investment bank, or client-servicing firm from trading firm. The Volcker
Rule represents Congress’s best effort in responding to populist anger at
Wall Street banks’ risk taking while dealing with the inescapable reality
that such entities have grown so powerful and vital that any strongworded regulation of them would perhaps do more harm than good (if it
were able to get off the ground in Congress in the first place). The
definitional suggestions presented in this article represent a proposed
strategy in a game of roulette at the casino. Try as you might, don’t be
surprised if the house ends up with all your money at the end of the
night.
VII. EPILOGUE
The Volcker Rule’s passage into law makes it perhaps unlikely that
any further regulation of proprietary trading will occur. But if Congress
were to eventually realize that the Volcker Rule’s separation of
proprietary trading from marketmaking is functionally impossible to
implement, then the following idea may serve as a better regulatory
model.
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The problem with the Volcker Rule is that it tries to regulate actions
instead of structures. Structures are limited in nature and not easy to
modify. Glass-Steagall’s separation of investment banking from
commercial banking—its regulation of structures—drew broad and
bright lines in flat and unshifting concrete. Trading actions are vague,
numerous, and easy to modify. Defining them, much less regulating
them, is like drawing lines in the sand of the Sahara Desert during a
sandstorm with 80 mile per hour winds—a futile task. The sand changes
shape before the lines are fully drawn, just as trades can be reconfigured
and redefined before regulations are set into place. An action-based
regulatory model, as stated above, will simply never work.
A return to Glass-Steagall, as addressed in Part III, is unfeasible.
However, structures do provide a reliable set of lines to draw. Because
trading actions are too hard to define, it is not worthwhile to try to
distinguish market-making from proprietary trading. The model proposed
here would not distinguish between the actions taking place on a trading
desk. All of the types of sales and trading activity that were legal before
the passage of the Volcker Rule would still be legal. The key to this
system, just as in the effective Glass-Steagall Act, lies in structure. Sales
and trading need to be insulated from the deposit-taking institution
owned by the bank holding company128 and thus the holding company’s
access to the Discount Window. This is to prevent the moral hazard
problem present when Bank Holding Companies can bail out their
imploding trading desks with taxpayer money, accessed through the
Discount Window. This is accomplished by taking the sales and trading
units of each of the large bank-holding companies and forcing the
holding companies to spin them off into wholly owned subsidiary
corporations. The subsidiary corporation would be a bankruptcy-remote
entity. In the event of the subsidiary corporation’s insolvency, its
creditors would not be able to go after the assets or the Federal Reserve
Discount Window facility of the parent holding company. The bank
holding companies would provide the starting capital for its subsidiary
corporation, and would receive all of the trading profits, less the amount
used to pay its employees or to be held in reserve, as a dividend.
The idea of the subsidiary’s “capital reserve” is important. Under this
system, the parent company is only able to provide the subsidiary
corporation with capital at its formation. After that time, the subsidiary
corporation’s only capital flow is outward, from the subsidiary to the
parent in the form of a dividend. If the subsidiary corporation needs
additional funds, it has to rely on its reserve, or it may borrow against its
assets from anyone except its parent-holding company or any company
under its parent’s control. This is because when the subsidiary’s own
capital can be replenished by taxpayer capital, then the firm, and thus the
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traders, have no “skin in the game.” But there is a strong taxpayer
incentive to force them to have skin in the game.
A regulatory regime that permits proprietary trading (because it is
too difficult not to) needs to make sure that if a subsidiary trading
corporation goes bust, the traders and the bank are the ones that hurt the
most. They need to be the ones to lose a proverbial finger.
If the bank were free to capitalize as many subsidiary trading
corporations as it wished to, it would have no desire to bail out a failing
subsidiary when it could easily sponsor a new one the next day. The
proposed regime would mandate that a bank-holding company only be
allowed to have one subsidiary trading corporation under its control. This
corporation would manage all of its sales and trading operations. In the
event of that subsidiary’s insolvency, there would be a ten-year waiting
period before the bank-holding company would be able to sponsor
another one. This puts skin in the game.
The effect of this is to say that a bank’s traders may engage in all
manner of risky proprietary trading. However, if they blow up, the bank
loses out on the extensive revenues gained from client-facing trades, the
clients leave for rival banks, the bank suffers significant reputational
harms, and the traders lose their jobs because the bank no longer has a
sales and trading subsidiary. This creates the incentive for the banks to
heavily police the activities of their traders, and for the traders to keep a
watchful eye on their own risk. Both stand to suffer greatly otherwise.
Regulation of this sort would be novel and perhaps of the sort to
drive banks elsewhere. As stated before, the United States government
has an interest in keeping banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley
based in the U.S. It is unlikely that such a sweeping change to the
regulation of sales and trading would be passed in the U.S. unilaterally
for fear that banks would flee for Europe or Asia. However, the U.S. also
occupies a position as world leader for legal innovation. Successful
implementation of effective financial regulation would require the
coordinated efforts of the U.S., the UK, and several other G-20 nations in
order to ensure that no international regulatory arbitrage opportunities
exist.
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